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NATO’s New Strategic Concept:  








The recent war in Georgia reinvigorated Estonia’s traditional security concerns as Russia’s 
behaviour was taken to be a blunt proof to the collapse of the dream of an emerging post-
modern security system in Europe where states reject the use of force for resolving disputes 
and do not consider invading each other.1 Consequently, Estonia’s concerns regarding the 
sufficiency of NATO’s political deterrent and the solidity of its collective defence guarantee in 
case of a more traditional kind of confrontation in the Baltic region have considerably intensified. 
For the Alliance as a whole, the conflict between Russia and Georgia has amplified the difficult 
dilemmas that NATO has been struggling with throughout its post-Cold War existence. If 
anything, Russia’s apparent resurgence as a geopolitical competitor to NATO in Europe has 
made the Alliance’s attempts to reconcile its post-9/11 profile of fighting global contingencies 
(i.e. trans-national terrorism) at their source with its traditional profile of collective defence even 
more complicated. Whilst 9/11 provided a wake-up call on the increasing prominence of 
asymmetrical non-state security risks, 8/8/8 in turn signifies for NATO the urgent need to re-
think its traditional security predicament along with addressing the host of other issues related 
to its out-of-area crisis management operations. What is crystal clear by now is that Russia has 
never really bought NATO’s declared transformation from a strictly politico-military alliance to an 
extended democratic security community with its new missions in the post-Cold War world. 
Apparently, it tends to still interpret the Alliance’s eastern enlargement and partnership networks 
as an essentially anti-Russian geopolitical competition game in the traditional fringes of 
Western-Russian rivalry for dominance. NATO’s challenge is therefore to re-conceptualise and 
reassert its strategy of deterrence without proving the Russian rhetoric of confrontation right. 
 
This paper sketches the main concerns of Estonia in the context of the revival of a possibility of 
a traditional geopolitical confrontation at NATO’s eastern fringes, and delineates its respective 
interests vis-à-vis the new strategic concept of NATO. The process of opening the existing 
strategic concept for consultations among the member states is hoped to be launched at 
NATO’s 60th anniversary summit in April 2009. According to NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer, the new strategic concept of the Alliance should “lay out why NATO is unique; 
how it is transforming; and how it will tackle the core security challenges before us.” 2  
Importantly for Estonia’s (as well as the rest of the Baltic states’) domestic grievances about the 
firmness of the collective defence clause in case of a more traditional kind of regional conflict, 
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 On modern and post-modern security systems, see Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and 
Chaos in the Twenty-First Century. London: Atlantic Books, 2004. 
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the Secretary General has particularly emphasised the need of NATO’s new strategic concept 
to “strengthen our common purpose, and…[to] ensure that NATO remains understood by our 
publics, and relevant to their security needs” (ibid.).  
 
It is indeed important that NATO as an alliance would not diverge too much from what the allies 
are actually doing and emphasising in their strategic documents and public discussions at the 
national level. Currently, national strategies do not always really fit with NATO’s overall visions – 
and this is a remarkable source of strategic confusion, vulnerability as well as of wasting 
anyway scarce resources. A key rationale for compiling a new strategic concept for NATO 
would therefore be to increase its internal legitimacy and political relevance for the home 
audiences of the allies.  
 
A mere ‘branding strategy’ for re-adjusting NATO to the changed strategic environment would 
therefore clearly not suffice. Strong rhetoric on the solidity of collective defence should be 
synchronised with the actual daily practice of the Alliance that has, especially after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on the United States, been seriously tilted towards out of area operations. It is 
thus critically important to back up political promises with actual practices – respective collective 
defence planning activities and collective exercises,3 as well as to pay considerate attention 
towards maximising the ‘double-utilisation’ of the Alliance’s capabilities for its two core missions 
(i.e. collective defence of its member states’ territories along with crisis management operations 
outside of the immediate Euro-Atlantic area). This would, in and of itself, give new substance to 
NATO’s traditional deterrent role. 
 
II Re-thinking collective defence 
  
Estonia’s greatest concern in relation to NATO’s new strategic concept lies in the possibility that 
the meaning of ‘collective defence’ in case of the strategic confrontation with Russia remains 
unspecified and thus politically hollow. Albeit all strategic documents of the Alliance since the 
end of the Cold War have emphasised the continuing centrality of ‘common defence’, NATO 
has restrained itself from providing traditional military ‘backing’ to this clause in the new eastern 
member states in fear of antagonising Russia.  
 
NATO’s Comprehensive Political Guidance of 2006 maintains that ‘collective defence will 
remain the core purpose of the Alliance’. Yet, it also hastens to add that ‘the character of 
potential Article 5 challenges is continuing to evolve’ (§ 5). Quite clearly, the notion of ‘collective 
defence’ has had slightly different connotations in 1949 when NATO was established; after the 
end of the Cold War in the context of the Western euphoria over the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact; after 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States; and today, in 
2008, in the context of the re-emergence of NATO’s traditional security agenda in parallel to its 
global stabilisation missions.  
                                                 
3
 It is interesting to note here that the Alliance’s last significant collective defence exercise took place only in 
2002 – and there has not been any other since that date. 
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The notion of collective defence was conceptually enlarged after 9/11 so that traditionally 
understood state-led direct aggression towards a member state of the Alliance was not anymore 
its immediate synonym. Yet, whilst before the Russia-Georgia war of August 2008, the 
intellectual bone of contention in the debates over NATO’s new strategic vision focussed on the 
meaning of the expanded notion of ‘collective defence’, it is rather the re-iteration of the 
‘traditional’ content of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that is currently being called for in the 
Baltic states and Poland. Before Russia’s demonstration of power in Georgia, NATO debated 
the re-conceptualisation of Article 5 in the new strategic concept in terms of its potential 
enlargement in order to address new security challenges (i.e. cyber and energy contingencies) 
along with the more traditional ones. Today, in light of Russia’s recent action in Georgia and the 
fact that the Alliance does not actually have collective military presence of any significance in 
the new Eastern European members of NATO, the need to rethink the nature of NATO’s 
deterrence policy against a more traditional kind of security contingency in the eastern fringes of 
the Alliance, and to redesign NATO’s military deterrent and retool its operational kit accordingly, 
has re-emerged with compelling urgency. 
 
For Estonia, the question of the day is thus: how to acknowledge within the scope of ‘Article 
5 threats to the Alliance’ the unfortunate return of traditional regional security concerns 
(with respective implications for strategic contingency planning in the Baltic region) 
without openly antagonising Russia? How to reconcile the ‘enlarged’ understanding of Article 
5 with the fact that, against most of the predictions of the 1990s, Realpolitik with its potential for 
hot regional crises has returned with vigour in NATO’s partner country of Russia? Estonian 
public opinion remains concerned whether Russia’s recent aggressive self-affirmation vis-à-vis 
Georgia has actually managed to get across to all of the NATO allies their post-Cold War erring 
against the major principle of any strategic planning: the need to be conscious about the human 
tendency to evaluate and predict one’s opponent’s behaviour according to one’s own standards. 
NATO redesigned itself after the end of the Cold War, expecting a re-invention of a similar kind 
from Russia as the legal and political successor of the Soviet Union as well. This expectation 
has not been sufficiently reciprocated, to say the least, as the recent events in Georgia have 
sadly illuminated. For NATO, yet again, the need to reinvent itself and strike a new balance 
between a defensive regional alliance and a global intervention force has been underscored by 
the Russian-Georgian war. 
 
States like Estonia are therefore pondering whether the understanding that has informed 
NATO’s post-Cold War transformation according to which the Alliance’s territorial integrity and 
its members’ political sovereignty is not anymore existentially threatened is still valid in the 
context where Russia seems to be continuously testing the Western organisations’ political 
integrity and credibility. Whilst it is unlikely that Russia’s attempts to restore its former 
hegemony in Eastern Europe would take militarily as openly aggressive forms as they have in 
Georgia, the recent strategic developments nevertheless point to the legitimacy of the Baltic 
states’ suspicions about disregarding the continuing significance of the traditional understanding 
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of ‘collective defence’ in the eastern flank of the Alliance. Even if it is unlikely that Russia would 
aim at an open attack or direct military and political takeover against the Baltic states, the signs 
of its attempts to disturb the effective functioning of the respective state apparatuses by 
destabilising the Baltic societies have nevertheless been clearly visible throughout the 1990s till 
today (e.g., the meddling with the ‘Bronze Soldier’-affair in Estonia and the overall ‘ethnic 
engineering’ attempts of the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia). If anything, this trend has 
intensified in the course of the last few years. 
  
Estonia’s concerns therefore call for re-emphasising the possibility of regional crises and 
conflicts at the borders (or in the border regions) of the Alliance in the new strategic concept of 
NATO. The war in Georgia, reminiscent of Russia’s traditional great power politics for its non-
hesitance to use military power in order to secure its geopolitical interests, has further fed 
Estonians’ distress about the possible erosion of NATO’s principle of ‘indivisibility of security’ 
and the ‘sense of equal security’ among the members of the Alliance - that have been evoked in 
the official documents of NATO since 1991, including the current strategic concept of 1999 – in 
case of the Alliance’s direct confrontation with Russia in the Baltic region. Sustaining the core 
importance of Article 5 as NATO’s grounding principle and strategic backbone, along with 
collective and transparent NATO defence planning system, would consequently be in 
accordance with Estonia’s natural self-preservation instincts. 
 
Estonia’s anxieties could be somewhat alleviated if the following clauses of the NATO’s existing 
Strategic Concept of 1999 would retain their political centrality, and their rhetorical prominence 
would be further matched with a bolstered military content: 
 
• Deterrence and Defence: To defer and defend against any threat of aggression against 
any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty 
(§ 10). 
 
• The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the 
territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. /--/ NATO 
forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence while conducting 
effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations (§ 47). 
 
• Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance, through daily cooperation in both the 
political and military spheres, ensure that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own 
national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges (§ 8) (emphasis added). 
 
Against the worry of the emergence of a possible stratification within the Alliance, or the 
development of circles of states in the Alliance with different degrees of security, the principles 
of allied solidarity and strategic unity should remain paramount for all NATO missions (cf. § 41 
of the Strategic Concept of 1999). 
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III Re-thinking deterrence 
 
NATO’s current strategic concept lists deterrence and defence ‘against any threat of aggression 
against any NATO member state as provided in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty’ 
among its fundamental security tasks. Yet, with the emergence of trans-national terrorist 
networks as the most significant threat to NATO since 9/11, the nature of deterrence has 
‘evolved’ along with the challenges of the Article 5 kind. Whilst deterrence as a general strategy 
is aimed at persuading an adversary not to take action that it might otherwise have done, 
terrorists are difficult to deter in the way states could – particularly if death is not regarded as 
unacceptable loss and thus an ultimate threat that should be avoided at all costs, but rather 
welcomed as an end in itself by suicide terrorists.4 
 
NATO’s new strategic concept should thus clarify what the Allies regard as the soundest 
concept of deterrence in the changed strategic circumstances. From Estonia’s viewpoint, it 
should further address the question of how to supplement NATO’s general deterrence 
strategy against its new and old challengers with more specific, tailor-made deterrents 
for the Baltic security purposes? Deterrence, after all, only works if the threat of military 
retaliation is credible, and if the putative aggressor has no doubts about the political intention of 
its opponent to use it. As the standards of credibility for the potential contesters of NATO’s 
deterrent naturally vary between state and non-state actors, a deterrent strategy could be 
formulated at different levels of generality, ranging from systemic to more specifically designed.5  
 
At the broadest end of the spectrum, NATO’s goal should be, as ever, to make deterrence apply 
system-wide, in the hope that the allied capabilities and the general reputation of the Alliance 
will be sufficient to deter any actor in the international system from taking any unwanted action, 
without necessarily making any explicit deterrent threats. Besides general systemic deterrence 
intended to prevent all possible challenges to the Alliance, NATO should further specify its 
deterrent message by delineating the specific types of action it most seeks to prevent. This 
declaratory strategy of situation-specific deterrence avoids the ‘overkill’ risk of individually 
tailored deterrence that could easily become preoccupied with the need to craft a different 
message for each individual actor and thus confuse the clarity of the overall deterrent signal of 
the Alliance. Similarly, situation-specific deterrence strategy triumphs over the all-too-general 
systemic deterrence, which relies on a vague threat of potentially devastating consequences for 
any unwanted action vis-à-vis the Alliance. The situation-specific deterrence of NATO would 
detail more precisely the red lines that should not be crossed against its member states, as well 
as spell out explicitly the consequences to be expected by the contestants of these red lines.6 
By presenting NATO’s strategic message against a particular type of behaviour rather than 
                                                 
4
 Cf. Christopher Daase and Oliver Kessler, “Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘’War on Terror’: Uncertainty and 
the Political Construction of Danger,” Security Dialogue vol. 38, no. 4 (2007), p. 421. 
5
 See Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Wrestling with Deterrence: Bush Administration Strategy After 9/11,” Contemporary 
Security Policy vol. 29, no. 2, 2008, pp. 229-65 for further discussion on different types of deterrence. 
6
 Cf. ibid., p. 255. 
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against any concrete actor, the Alliance would manage to avoid the reefs of succumbing to the 
rhetorical and political confrontation with Russia that the latter has recently sought to engage it 
in. 
 
In practical terms, NATO’s general, system-wide deterrence effect could be sustained by the 
continuing presence of the United States’ nuclear forces in Europe. Whilst the Alliance’s 
deterrence posture has historically been defensive rather than punishing, it nevertheless derives 
from the actual war-fighting capability, force preparation and military doctrine of the Allied 
strategic forces. Yet, as the deterrence value of nuclear weapons depends on the perceived 
willingness of the allies by the challengers of this deterrent to actually deliver the promise of 
destroying whole societies through nuclear counter-strikes, the moral legitimacy of the threat of 
nuclear retaliation becomes very questionable indeed, and could thus hardly serve as the sole 
basis for NATO’s deterrence strategy in today’s global security environment. It is thus important 
to emphasise that the aim of NATO’s nuclear deterrent is ultimately political: to guarantee 
peace, to avoid military conflicts, and to deter the Alliance’s conventionally armed or nuclear 
weapons-empowered potential antagonists.  
 
NATO’s ‘minimal declaratory deterrent’ tailored for the Baltic purposes as delineated in its new 
strategic concept could be guaranteed by:  
 
(i) sustaining a fair balance in the new strategic concept’s wording of the Alliance’s 
new global missions and its more traditional tasks towards the defence of its 
member states so that neither would overshadow the other; 
 
(ii) acknowledging in the new strategic concept the recent problematic developments 
in the Euro-Atlantic security environment besides the global trends of international 
terrorism and the proliferation of the WMD (i.e. attempts of ‘some states’ to 
influence their neighbours’ political choices at home and abroad by military, 
economic, energy, and other means); 
 
(iii) taking clear notice of Russia and its internal and external political developments 
as essential factors shaping the Alliance’s security environment; 
 
(iv) drawing an explicit structural and rhetorical distinction between NATO’s different 
partnerships (i.e. Russia and Ukraine that are currently tackled under the same 
heading of ‘Partnership, Cooperation, and Dialogue’) as well as specifying the 
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IV The solidity of the transatlantic link 
 
Estonia is anxious about the possibility that the strategic disagreements between the allies over 
the necessity of some mission far away from the allied territory (e.g. Iraq) could politically ‘travel’ 
to the solidity of NATO’s collective defence clause, turning the obligation of collective defence to 
yet another ‘coalition of the willing’-type of compromise. The centrality of the transatlantic link by 
which ‘the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe’ (§ 7) thus 
remains of critical importance for Estonia also in the new strategic concept of the Alliance. As 
Estonia is afraid of the possibility of NATO’s diminishing importance as ‘an essential 
transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests’ (§ 10), 
its worst imaginable scenario would be if the US would begin approaching NATO as merely an 
optional device for grouping its allies, rather than as the core basis of its own security. 
 
For its fear of the possible weakening of the transatlantic link, and thus the de facto divisibility of 
the security of Europe and that of North America, Estonia would be all for emphasising in the 
new strategic vision of NATO that the Alliance should remain “the essential forum for 
consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security 
and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty” (§ 25). Relatedly, the 
description of the EU-NATO cooperation in the new strategic concept of the Alliance (just as the 
very cooperation itself) should be taken to a much more advanced level of specification than is 




It is in Estonia’s interest that the allies would reach a sustainable minimal agreement on a 
common threat perception in NATO’s ‘traditional’ security front, as well as on where to go with 
that perception, or what to do with it. From Estonia’s standpoint, a new strategic concept of 
NATO should, first and foremost, provide an answer to these core questions. The prediction that 
has guided NATO’s post-Cold War self-reinvention – that there is only a very low probability of 
conflict between the established nuclear powers in the Euro-Atlantic area – has not turned out 
to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, but a fallacy. What is really needed, then, is a common analysis 
and agreement on a response to the re-emerged regional security dilemmas for the Alliance. 
That inevitably implies a further clarification of NATO-Russia strategic relationship and the 
future basis of NATO’s enlargement policy: whether to continue with an openly value-based 
course, or to rethink the enlargement’s strategic incentives in order to include some states that 
might not be fully applicable in terms of their democratic credentials as of yet, but that could 
considerably buttress the territorial defence of today’s NATO.7 
 
                                                 
7
 As suggested by Ronald Asmus, ”NATO's Hour," The Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2008. 
